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A common pattern of control in ﬁrms is for management to retain a broad set of rights, while
the remaining stakeholders’ contracts provide them with targeted veto rights over speciﬁc classes
of decisions. We explain this pattern of control sharing as an eﬃcient organizational response
that balances the need to encourage management to account for stakeholders’ interests against
the need to prevent self-interested stakeholders from blocking valuable proposals. Enforceable
obligations of good faith and fair dealing play an essential role in facilitating undivided manage-
ment control of many decisions. With these legal protections (but not without them), shared
control is more likely when the parties are more symmetrically informed and hence better able
to bargain to eﬃcient decisions.
Keywords: Contract theory, control rights, ownership rights, shared control.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D23, K12.
∗Financial support for Milgrom’s research was provided by the National Science Foundation under grant ITR-
0427770. We thank John Hegeman for his able research assistance.1 Introduction
Control rights are among the primary instruments for protecting stakeholder interests in a ﬁrm,
but those protections come at a cost. Hansmann (1996) argues persuasively that diverse interests
in the ownership group promotes bargaining deadlock, but he also claims that these costs play a
decisive role in explaining why ﬁrms are typically owned by members of a single group of “patrons”
(such as investors, customers, employees, or suppliers), rather than being dispersed among several
such groups.1 We oﬀer an alternative account of shared control that takes issue with Hansmann’s
second ﬁnding and also with the analyses of ownership by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart
and Moore (1990), which conclude that control should never be shared.
Hansmann’s analysis of why ownership rights are commonly vested in one single group of patrons
is incomplete in at least two ways. First, the logic of his argument, which claims that diverse
interests in the controlling group reduce the eﬀectiveness of collective decision making, would
seem to apply to all kinds of control rights, yet control of important business decisions is often
divided. While there is typically one group that retains a broad set of decision rights (management
in widely held corporations), other groups of stakeholders frequently share control through veto
rights over important classes of decisions. Examples include loan contracts that restrict the ability
of management to sell assets or increase dividends without the explicit approval of the lender, labor
contracts that limit management’s ability to reassign workers, reduce employment or adopt new
technologies without approval, and the right of shareholders to approve any management proposal
to merge or sell the ﬁrm.2
Second, Hansmann’s analytical focus on the costs of shared control omits the equally important
analysis of its beneﬁts. Shared control can add value by ensuring that interests besides those of
management received proper weight in the ﬁrm’s decisions. Like the costs of shared control, the
beneﬁts arise precisely because the interests of management and stakeholders are diverse. The
examples cited above highlight the central importance of this source of beneﬁts. In each example,
stakeholders have veto rights—and thus share control—over decisions for which interests come
sharply into conﬂict.
This critique of Hansmann’s analysis raises several questions. Is control exercised through veto
1Hansmann’s examples include not only ﬁrms owned by shareholder-investors, but also rural supply and marketing
cooperatives owned by farmers (as customers or suppliers), professional ﬁrms which are often employee-owned, etc.
As he emphasizes, even within a group of patrons, ownership is often concentrated in a sub-group: stockholders but
not bank lenders in an investor-owned ﬁrm, senior lawyers but not junior lawyers or clerks in a law ﬁrm, and so on.
2Although shareholders are commonly viewed as having special status as a ﬁrm’s “owners,” shareholders in large
public corporations have only a limited ability to intervene in most decisions. The current debate over whether
shareholders should have greater power to select directors highlights the limited powers of shareholders and the need
for the securities laws to balance the beneﬁts of protecting shareholders against the cost of shareholder interference
in managerial decision-making. In this context, shareholders can often be properly viewed as another stakeholder
with limited veto rights.
1rights the same as control through ownership rights? If not, what is the diﬀerence? What accounts
for the common sharing of some signiﬁcant decision rights but not of ownership rights?
The existing economics literature frequently analyzes shared ownership as the same as veto
rights.3 When there are just two parties and one decision at issue, the veto conception of shared
control is indeed a proper one; the only possible assignments of the single decision right are to
one party or the other or jointly, with both possessing a veto. When there are two or more
decisions, however, shared ownership without contracting may be a blunt instrument, resulting
in bundling decision rights unnecessarily. With multiple stakeholders and multiple decisions, veto
rights established by contracts and voting rights on the board can be used in various combinations.4
Like Hansmann, we treat the ﬁrm as a legal entity—a nexus for contracting, whose owners
retain the legal right to make all decisions not explicitly assigned or shared by contract or limited
by law. Stated more brieﬂy, owners have residual rights of control. Our conception of these
rights, however, is subtly diﬀerent from the conception employed in the well known paper by
Grossman and Hart (1986). Their treatment distinguishes contractible rights from residual rights
which are not contractible and which must therefore vest in the owner. Their formal model then
focuses on how the assignment of these ﬁxed residual rights aﬀects various stakeholders’ investment
incentives. In contrast, our conception treats all decisions as falling into contractible classes, such as
“product pricing,” “asset sales,” “workforce reductions,” and so on. Contracting in our conception
is still incomplete, because individual decisions cannot be speciﬁed in advance, but there is no
distinguished set of decisions that are forced to be residual because they are uncontractible. Our
analysis focuses on which classes of decision rights the parties optimally share. Importantly for our
analysis, the residual—the decision rights that the owners do not share with other stakeholders—is
endogenous and the key mechanism is one of selection (of which rights are residual) rather than
one of assignment (of exogenously given residual rights). 5
This diﬀerent perspective on residual control enables a combined explanation of Hansmann’s
observation that ownership typically vests with a single group of patrons and the fact that shared
control through contracting is common. In our selection framing, the question of why ownership
is vested in a single group is recast as: why is control sharing done predominantly by contracts
establishing veto rights, rather than by voting membership on a board of directors? We oﬀer a
simple answer: contractual veto rights typically provide more secure and better targeted protection
for stakeholders’ interests than do various voting rights alternatives. Compared to simple majority
3See, for example, Hart and Moore (1990).
4Venture capitalists often share control with founders and others using mixed arrangements of this sort, retaining
veto rights over some decisions and also having voting representation on the board of directors. See section 8.
5Aghion and Bolton (1992) created the ﬁrst model with endogenous control rights in their study of ﬁnancial
contracting. Their treatment allows contract provisions to aﬀect who sits at the helm of the ﬁrm and exercises
control, highlighting the subtle relationship between contracting and residual control.
2voting with multiple interests represented, veto rights are more secure because they allow workers
to protect their jobs, lenders to protect the security for their loans, and so on, without fear that
they will be outvoted by a group including management. In principle, it is possible to establish
super-majority voting rules that create eﬀective veto rights for multiple voting groups on a board
of directors. Contractual veto rights are superior, however, because optimal contracts target vetoes
more narrowly. In decisions for which management’s interests are known to be well-aligned with
eﬃciency, super-majority voting among stakeholders can lead to deadlock, but optimal contracting
gives veto rights to none of the stakeholders (see section 2).
Our formal model develops ideas borrowed from Williamson (1985, 2002) about how control
structures aﬀect the ability of the ﬁrm to make eﬀective decisions in response to new circumstances
and opportunities. We treat a situation with two interested parties, whom we call “management”
and “the stakeholder.” Only management observes potential projects, so it alone makes proposals.
In addition, management is better informed than the stakeholder about the distributional conse-
quences of its proposals, and this information asymmetry sometimes leads to failures of bargaining
and to decisions that fail to maximize value.
The central tension in our model is that, regardless of how control is assigned, disagreements
between management and the stakeholder can lead to poor decisions. If the project is a good one
that also beneﬁts management and the stakeholder has a veto right, then failure to agree about
appropriate compensation for the stakeholder leads to a good proposal being blocked. If, on the
other hand, the project is a bad one that nevertheless beneﬁts management and the stakeholder
has no veto right, then failure to agree about appropriate compensation for management leads to a
bad proposal being implemented. Regardless of whether control is shared or undivided, bargaining
ineﬃciencies from asymmetric information can disrupt optimal decisions.
A diﬀerence between the two control arrangements emerges when the environment allows for
legal enforcement of “ﬁduciary duties” or obligations of “good faith and fair dealing.” To illustrate
the role of these, suppose management approaches its lender and demands a payment in exchange
for not undertaking a risky project with negative value but which is nevertheless proﬁtable for
management. Demands such as this may be very common in economies where legal institutions
provide no protections against them. Such extortionate demands are likely to be less common in
economies where management has an enforceable legal obligation such as that of good faith and fair
dealing that is too transparently violated by large transfers made to management. Management’s
ﬁduciary duties to shareholders may have a similar or greater eﬀect in terms of preventing such
demands.
In the model described above, legal rules that block demands—even extortionate demands—are
actually destructive of value because they introduce an additional barrier to eﬃcient negotiations.
3For if the project under consideration both beneﬁts management and destroys value, then eﬃ-
ciency can be achieved only if the parties agree to compensate management for refraining from the
project. This argument, however, assumes that the quality of proposals is exogenous. An alterna-
tive conception, which we now adopt, is that management can aﬀect the kinds of proposals that
are generated. Eﬀective legal rules that make extortion diﬃcult can then induce management to
propose more valuable projects.6 This second eﬀect can be more important than the ﬁrst, making
it useful to limit transfers from management to the stakeholder.
When control is shared, the stakeholder has veto power over proposals, so management has
nothing to gain by generating bad proposals that are bad for the stakeholder. Limiting bargaining
when control is shared can only be harmful, because bargaining is needed for eﬃcient adaptations
when proposals are good. So, in our model, the legal duties are beneﬁcial only when management
has undivided control.
Thus, legal rules limiting transfers to management aﬀect the performance of the two control
structures diﬀerently. They have no eﬀect on the amount of bargaining when control is shared,
but they make bargaining less frequent when control is undivided. This asymmetry aﬀects the
comparative statics of eﬃcient control. As bargaining becomes less eﬃcient, losses from ineﬃcient
decisions increase when there is shared control, but are unaﬀected when control is undivided.
Hence, undivided control is diﬀerentially favored as parties become less likely to reach eﬃcient
decisions through negotiation. In particular, we show that as stakeholders become more poorly
informed relative to management, bargaining is more likely to breakdown, decreasing the relative
attractiveness of shared control.
We introduce our model in the next section and analyze the eﬀect of bargaining frictions on
diﬀerent governance structures in section 3. In sections 4 and 5, we show that it may be eﬃcient
to limit bargaining among parties in the ﬁrm and analyze the manager’s incentives to invest in
proposals. In section 6, we explore the impact of incentive contracts. We discuss how our model
applies to a ﬁrm’s creditors, employees, and minority shareholders in section 7. Finally, section 8
concludes.
2 The Firm and Its Governance Structure
Consider a ﬁrm with two risk-neutral parties: a manager who generates a proposal and a stakeholder
with an interest in whether the proposal is implemented. In the baseline model, the manager
6One may wonder whether it is always possible for management to ﬁnd some form of compensation that evades
such rules, restoring the previous results. It is easy to imagine, however, policies that make detection of extortionate
demands easier. For example, management compensation may be reviewed and ﬁxed on a regular cycle, say annually,
while projects arise more frequently. Any major change to management compensation that occurs oﬀ-cycle might be
viewed with particular suspicion.
4always successfully generates a proposal and its quality is independent of the manager’s eﬀort.
With probability q, the state is “good” (g) and the project increases joint surplus; otherwise, the
state is “bad” (b) and the project is unproductive. In state i, the manager’s payoﬀ is mi = πi + r
and the stakeholder’s payoﬀ is si = πi − r, where πg > 0 and πb ≤ 0. The proposal redistributes a
positive amount r of wealth from the stakeholder to manager. We assume that r has a continuous
distribution with support on [rl,rh] where 0 ≤ rl < rh < ∞.
The fact that the redistribution always favors the manager implies that the manager is biased
toward implementing the project, which is the source of the conﬂict the model. In addition, we
assume that the manager is better informed about the redistributive consequences of the project:
the manager observes the realized value of r prior to implementing the project, while the stakeholder
observes r only with probability z. For simplicity, we assume that both parties are fully informed
about the proposal’s quality.
During their initial contract negotiation and prior to working together, the manager and stake-
holder must agree on how the relevant decisions will be governed. They can either give the manager
an unfettered right to implement a proposal or they can give the stakeholder a veto over the man-
ager’s decisions. We refer to the former governance structure as “undivided control” and the latter
structure as “shared control.”7 We assume that the parties can make arbitrary side payments and
that they eventually agree on the control structure that maximizes the total surplus.
Regardless of the governance structure, the parties may bargain ex post over the ﬁrm’s course
of action. For simplicity, we assume the following bargaining protocol: the manager makes a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the stakeholder specifying transfers between the parties contingent upon
implementation of the proposal. The negotiation of transfers is followed by a decision stage. If
control is undivided, the decision stage simply consists of the manager deciding whether to imple-
ment the proposal. Under shared control, the project is implemented only if both the manager and
stakeholder allow it.
Bargaining ineﬃciency can happen in this model because the stakeholder may be uninformed.
With probability z, the stakeholder observes the redistributive consequences of the proposal and
with probability 1−z it does not. Management knows whether the stakeholder is informed. Other
things equal, the parameter z determines the eﬃciency of the bargaining process in the model.
Summarizing the timing of the model: (1) the parties decide on the allocation of control;
(2) the manager generates a proposal and observes the payoﬀs associated with the proposal; (3)
with probability z, the stakeholder observes the redistributive consequences of the proposal and the
manager learns about this event; (4) the parties negotiate transfers contingent upon implementation
of the project; and (5) the ﬁrm decides whether to implement the project in accordance with the
7We assume that only the manager is suﬃciently knowledgeable to propose projects, so the stakeholder cannot
have meaningful undivided control.
5chosen control structure.
Shared Control
When control is shared, the manager must obtain the approval of the stakeholder to implement
a proposal. When the state is bad, there is no scope for negotiation; any proposal that could
beneﬁt the manager will be vetoed by the stakeholder. When the state is good and both parties
are equally informed about the proposal’s distributional consequences, there is a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome: in the negotiation stage the manager proposes to the stakeholder a
contingent transfer, ys = max(−sg,0), which the stakeholder accepts, and in the decision stage the
manager goes forward with the project and is not vetoed by the stakeholder. Note that rl ≥ πg
implies sg is always negative and thus that the manager extracts the entire surplus.
However, the stakeholder is sometimes uninformed about the distributional consequences of
the proposal. In this case, if the manager oﬀers the stakeholder a transfer to accept the proposal,
the stakeholder updates her beliefs and decides whether to accept or reject the oﬀer. Subgame
perfection requires that the manager implement the project in the absence of a negotiated transfer
whenever the stakeholder would accept. Thus, in any pure strategy equilibrium the stakeholder
will never both accept a negative transfer and allow the project to proceed. The possible outcomes
are therefore unchange if we restrict attention to equilibria in which the manager always makes a
non-negative oﬀer. In any pure equilibrium, there is a smallest non-negative transfer t that the
stakeholder will accept and subsequently not veto the project. The manager then oﬀers t if and
only if mg ≥ t.8 At equilibrium, it must be proﬁtable for the stakeholder to accept the oﬀer and
refrain from vetoing, so
E[sg + t|mg ≥ t] ≥ 0 (1)
In general, there are many equilibria, but if the parties could agree about which equilibrium
to play at the time of the initial negotiation, they would elect the equilibrium with the lowest t.
Only that equilibrium maximizes the total value by having the most good proposals oﬀered by the
manager and accepted by the stakeholder. We will henceforth focus on that equilibrium. Thus,
let ts be the smallest non-negative transfer that satisﬁes inequality (1). Since r has a continuous
distribution and bounded support, the left-hand side of (1) is continuous and unbounded in t.
Hence, either E[sg + ts |mg ≥ t] = 0 or ts = 0. Thus, in expectation, the manager extracts the
entire surplus provided that E[sg] ≤ 0.
In this case (E[sg] ≤ 0) we can use the fact that sg = 2πg −mg to rewrite equation (1) so as to
8If mg < t, then the manager either makes no oﬀer or makes one that results in the stakeholder vetoing the
project.
6express the manager’s payoﬀ from acceptable proposals as:
E[mg − ts |mg − ts ≥ 0] = 2πg (2)
This equation (2) is an alternative expression of the fact that, in expectation, the manager extracts
the entire surplus from accepted proposals.
Summarizing the analysis, the parties never implement a bad proposal. When the proposal is
productive and stakeholder is informed, the parties bargain eﬃciently and implement the proposal,
generating a surplus of 2πg. However, with probability 1−z the stakeholder is uninformed. In this




z + (1 − z)Pr[mg ≥ ts]

2πg (3)
Although we have assumed a particular bargaining protocol and equilibrium for the asymmet-
ric equilibrium case, the essential economics of equation (3) remain the same regardless for any
asymmetric equilibrium approach to this problem. So long as bargaining is eﬃcient with symmetric
information and ineﬃcient with asymmetric information, we can modify the equation for alterna-
tive models by simply replacing the term Pr[mg ≥ ts] by another term to represent the bargaining
ineﬃciency. Much of the subsequent analysis would be similar for such a model.
Recall that rl is the minimum value of the support of r and let ¯ r denote the mean of r. We
have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose control is shared. Then, the manager never obtains approval for a bad
proposal. The manager always obtains approval for a good proposal if and only if the parameters
satisfy ¯ r − rl ≤ 2πg.
Proof. We have already seen that bad proposals are never implemented at equilibrium. Suppose
the proposal is good and that ¯ r −rl ≤ 2πg. If the manager were to oﬀer the stakeholder a transfer
t = πg + rl, the stakeholder’s expected payoﬀ would be 2πg + rl − ¯ r ≥ 0. It follows that the
equilibrium oﬀer, ts, is less than or equal to πg + rl, and the stakeholder accepts this oﬀer for
all realizations of r. Next, let 2πg < ¯ r − rl. In this case, the stakeholder would reject the oﬀer
t = πg + rl and it must the case that ts > πg + rl. Therefore, for realizations of r such that
rl ≤ r < ts − πg, the proposal is not implemented. 
The term r − rl is the uncertain component of the redistribution. Good projects remain unim-
plemented with positive probability when the expected value of this component, ¯ r − rl, is large
relative to the total surplus created by a good proposal, 2πg. An implication of Proposition 1 is
that when the distributional consequences of proposals are suﬃciently predictable or when the the
7value of good projects is suﬃciently high, shared control leads to eﬃcient decisions.
Undivided Control
When control is undivided, the manager can opt to proceed with a proposal unchecked by the
stakeholder. Suppose the proposal is productive and the stakeholder is informed. The manager
will never oﬀer a positive amount to the stakeholder as the manager can implement the project
without her approval. Moreover, the stakeholder will never agree to a negative transfer since she
knows the manager will implement the project even without a negotiated transfer. Therefore, in
contrast to the situation under shared control, good projects are always implemented and without
transfers.
The source of ineﬃciency when control is undivided is that the manager sometimes implements
bad proposals. If a proposal is bad, value would be increased if the stakeholder paid the manager
not to undertake the project. With our speciﬁed bargaining protocol, if both parties are equally
informed, the manager can demand a transfer yu = −sb when mb ≥ 0 and the stakeholder agrees to
pay. When mb < 0, however, the manager is unable to commit to implementing the project should
the stakeholder reject his demand and thus he is unable to extract any surplus from the stakeholder.
In both cases the project is never implemented and thus the outcome is eﬃcient. If, however, the
stakeholder is uninformed, then there may be disagreement over the appropriate payment to the
manager. By an analysis similar to that when control is shared, the equilibrium transfer is tu, where
tu is the largest transfer t that the stakeholder is willing to pay: E[−sbI{mb≥0} − t|t ≥ mb] ≥ 0.
The equilibrium transfer tu is the largest one satisfying this inequality and, since the distribution
of r is bounded and continuous, tu satisﬁes it with equality. Using sb + mb = 2πb and rearranging,
tu is the largest transfer satisfying:
E[t − mbI{mb≥0} |t − mb ≥ 0] = −2πb Pr(mb ≥ 0|t − mb ≥ 0) (4)
To understand equation (4), note that when the manager demands a transfer t to refrain from
a bad proposal, the potential net increase in his payoﬀ is t − mb. The manager is only willing to
accept such a transfer if t − mb ≥ 0. In equilibrium, as we have seen, the stakeholder gains zero
from the renegotiation, so when the renegotiation succeeds, the manager receives all the surplus
that is saved by refraining from the project. When tu − mb < 0, the stakeholder will reject any
demand the manager ﬁnds acceptable. Additionally, as tu is non-negative, tu −mb < 0 implies the
project is proﬁtable for the manager so the bad project is simply implemented in this case.
Thus, with undivided control, the parties always implement good proposals, generating a surplus
of 2πg, and implement bad proposals only when the stakeholder is both uninformed and bargaining
breaks down, generating a negative surplus of |2πb|. The probability of this event is (1 − q)(1 −
8z)Pr[mb ≥ tu]. The joint expected surplus when control is undivided is therefore:
U ≡ q2πg + (1 − q)(1 − z)Pr[mb > tu]2πb (5)
The following result is the analogue of Proposition 1 (the proof is along exactly the same lines and
is omitted).
Proposition 2 Suppose control is undivided. Then, the manager always implements a good pro-
posal. The manager never implements a bad proposal if and only if the parameters satisfy rh −
E[r|r > −πb] ≤ −(1 + Pr(mb ≥ 0))πb.
When the condition of the proposition is not satisﬁed, that is, when rh − E[r|r > −πb] >
−(1+Pr(mb ≥ 0))πb, the manager sometimes implements bad proposals. When rh −E[r|r > −πb]
is large, the realized value of the redistribution is sometimes much greater than the mean value,
leading to unavoidable disagreements over the appropriate compensation.
Comparing the two propositions, we ﬁnd that bargaining breaks down under shared control
when projects are good and redistributions to management are small and under undivided control
when projects are bad and redistributions are large. Together, the propositions highlight the
idea that it is the variability of any redistributions, rather than their average value, that leads to
ineﬃciency. We explore this comparative static and others in the next section.
Advantages of Targeted Veto Rights
As a simple variation on the preceding model, suppose that, in addition to management, there
are two other stakeholders whose interests are aﬀected by management’s proposal. In this section,
we focus on the special case in which the redistribution r > 0 accrues to one stakeholder at the
expense of other without aﬀecting management’s payoﬀ. Examples with roughly this structure
include decisions about which employee will be selected to ﬁll a job, which customer will be served
ﬁrst, or which supplier’s technology will be adopted. For simplicity, we take the manager’s payoﬀ to
be π and the payoﬀs of the two stakeholders to be r and −r. In these examples, management is likely
to understand which stakeholder beneﬁts most from its choice, but there may be private information
about the magnitude of r; we assume that resides with one or both of the two stakeholders.
Even without writing down the bargaining problem between the two stakeholders, it is obvi-
ous that, in this situation, management’s interest is perfectly aligned with value maximization,
so undivided control without bargaining leads it to make value maximizing decisions. If the two
stakeholders both held veto rights, then incomplete information bargaining would sometimes lead
to deadlock, blocking management’s value maximizing decisions. Undivided control (without bar-
gaining) is therefore preferred to allowing both stakeholders to have veto rights for such decisions.
9This analysis highlights an important advantage of using contractually targeted veto rights
rather than ownership rights to share control. Ownership rights that provide vetoes to diverse
groups of patrons, or even to individuals with heterogeneous interests within a single group of pa-
trons, make value -destroying bargaining deadlocks more likely. In contrast, optimal contractually
targeted veto rights avoid this cost, because no veto rights are provided for stakeholders in this case.
Veto rights are optimally used only to enable stakeholders to block decisions where management
may sometimes make ineﬃcient decisions and never to block management decisions merely because
of distributional squabbling among other stakeholders.
There are many more elements to a complete account of bargaining and control sharing with
multiple parties. With undivided control, if there are no legal or other safeguards that prevent
management from bargaining with just one of the stakeholders, then extortion or ineﬃcient decisions
may result when control is undivided. Here, we simply assume that such bargaining is impossible,
but we return to discuss the source and eﬀectiveness of legal restrictions in section 4. Even if
management can be prevented from making any demands and stakeholders have no veto rights, the
stakeholders still have powerful reasons to inﬂuence management’s decision and these can give rise
to inﬂuence costs, which are costly eﬀorts to distort management’s decisions. Mitigating those can
create a motivation for management to exclude some otherwise valuable sources of information and
to pursue equity as well as value in its decisions.9 These additional elements are omitted from our
formal analysis.
3 Comparative Statics of Bargaining and Optimal Control
Let us now focus again on a situation with just two interested parties: management and a single
stakeholder. We have shown for this case that when control is undivided, the manager sometimes
implements bad proposals and when control is shared, the stakeholder sometimes blocks good
proposals. To identify the optimal control structure, we must compare the magnitudes of the
resulting ineﬃciencies.
Let Ps ≡ Pr[mg ≥ ts] and Pu ≡ Pr[mb ≥ tu]. Ps is the probability a good project is approved
when control is shared, and Pu is the probability that a bad project is implemented when control
is undivided. From equations (3) and (5), we have that
U − S = 2(1 − z)

q(1 − Ps)πg + (1 − q)Puπb

(6)
Note that πb < 0, implying that the sign of U − S is ambiguous. Undivided control yields greater
beneﬁts when the bargaining frictions under shared control exceed that under undivided control.
9Milgrom (1988) and Milgrom and Roberts (1988) introduce “inﬂuence cost” models and derived these results.
10Recall that z is the likelihood that the stakeholder is informed. A direct implication of equations
(3), (5), and (6) is the following proposition:
Proposition 3 As the stakeholder becomes better informed (z increases), there is an increase in
the value of both shared control and undivided control. Fixing other parameters, changing the
magnitude of z has no impact on the sign of U − S and thus on the optimal governance structure.
As suggested in the previous section, it is the variability in redistribution r rather than its
mean level that leads to conﬂict and ineﬃciency. To formalize that claim, let us parameterize r
by writing r = ¯ r + σ, where ¯ r is the mean of r and  is a shock distributed on [−1,1] with mean
zero.10 The parameters of our model are now πg, πb, ¯ r, σ, z and q.
Proposition 4 Fix z and q. If control is shared, then for σ/πg > 2, the probability that good
proposals are blocked increases with σ/πg but is independent of ¯ r and πb.
Proof. The domain restrictions for σ ensure that the conditions of Propositions 1 and 2 do not
apply, so that the respective probabilities that bad projects are adopted and good projects are
rejected are not zero.
Let ¯ γ be the smallest solution of γ = E[| ≥ γ] − 2πg/σ. Since ts is the smallest solution
of 2, we have that mg − ts = σ( − ¯ γ), and the probability that a good proposal is blocked is
Pr[mg − ts < 0] = Pr[ < ¯ γ]. By a comparative statics theorem for smallest ﬁxed points due
to Milgrom and Roberts (1994), ¯ γ is a decreasing function of the parameter πg/σ (an increasing
function of σ/πg) and, by inspection, it is independent of the other parameters of the model. 
The following result is a direct implication of Proposition 4:
Corollary 1 As σ increases, the expected surplus associated with shared control declines.
In the case of undivided control, the comparative statics are more sensitive to the distribution
of the shock . In general, expected surplus can depend on all of the parameters πb, ¯ r, σ, z, and
q, and is only independent of πg. However, with an additional restriction we do have an analogous
result to Corollary 1:
Proposition 5 As σ increases, the expected surplus associated with undivided control declines pro-
vided that −πb < ¯ r.
Proof. Let ¯ γ be the largest solution to −γ+E[I{mb≥0}| ≤ γ]+ 1
σ(−(1+Pr[ ≤ γ])πb−(1−Pr[ ≤
γ])¯ r) ≥ 0. For −πb < ¯ r the left hand side of this inequality is decreasing in σ at any γ for which the
10The requirement that rl ≥ 0 implies that σ ≤ ¯ r.
11left hand side is equal to zero. It follows that ¯ γ is decreasing in σ. Since tu is the largest solution
of 4 we have that tu −πb = ¯ r +σγ and so tu and therefore expected surplus are both decreasing in
σ as well. 
When control is undivided, increasing σ does not unambiguously decrease surplus as in the case
of shared control because of an oﬀsetting eﬀect. When −πb > ¯ r, increasing σ increases Pr(mb ≥ 0)
thus allowing the manager to demand a greater transfer to forego implementation of the bad project
when control is undivided. The increased transfer results in more frequent agreement, which has
a positive eﬀect on surplus. Which of the two eﬀects is greater depends on the distribution of the
shock.
In applications below, we sometimes think of σ as capturing the residual uncertainty about
redistribution after any measurement. With that interpretation, as redistribution becomes more
diﬃcult to measure, the expected surplus falls for both shared and undivided control.
As the surplus πg associated with good proposals increases, the relative value of shared control
is aﬀected in two ways. On one hand, according to Proposition 4, good proposals become less
likely to be blocked but, on the other hand, each instance of blocking also becomes more costly.
Similarly, for undivided control, when the absolute loss |πb | from bad proposals increases, fewer
bad proposals may be implemented but each one results in a larger loss. Thus, although certain
extreme cases are clear, general changes in the parameters πg and πb have an ambiguous eﬀect on
the optimal control structure.
Finally, we have an easy comparative statics result for q.
Proposition 6 Fix all parameters except q. Then, U − S is increasing in q.
The proof is obvious. Since the costs of rejecting good proposals or accepting bad proposals
are proportional to the frequencies of the two kinds of proposals, shifting probability from bad
proposals to good ones favors undivided control.
A principal ﬁnding of this section is that an increase in the variability of the redistribution can
adversely impact both shared and undivided control, with indeterminate consequences for optimal
governance. This conclusion is a natural consequence of the observation that the allocation of
control does not eliminate the need for bargaining, but simply alters the direction of transfers
between the parties. However, in the following section, we argue that there are important reasons
why parties may seek to rule out certain kinds of extortionate negotiations. In that case, bargaining
costs impact shared and undivided control asymmetrically.
124 The Value of Limiting Bargaining
When control is undivided and the manager generates a bad proposal, eﬃciency requires that the
stakeholder must pay the manager not to implement the project. Although paying oﬀ a party to
refrain from taking a value-decreasing action is eﬃcient ex post, such payoﬀs create a perverse in-
centive for parties to invest in value-decreasing projects. In our model, the incentive is compounded
by our assumptions about the bargaining protocol: while the manager’s payoﬀ from bad proposals
remains positive, for each extra unit of loss the manager can threaten to impose on the stakeholder,
the manager can successfully demand an extra unit of transfer. Although this is extreme, standard
bargaining models would all imply that the manager would capture some portion of the extra unit
of the stakeholder’s loss at any bargaining solution.
We capture the possibility of value-decreasing investments in a stark manner by assuming that
instead of working on a potentially productive proposal, the manager can choose to engage in pure
rent-seeking and develop a proposal that imposes a high cost of H on the stakeholder while yielding
no direct beneﬁt or cost to the manager. We further simplify by assuming that when the manager
develops such a proposal, the stakeholder is always aware of it. Then, with undivided control, the
manager can always guarantee that it receives a transfer of H. The conclusion is obvious:
Proposition 7 If control is undivided and H is suﬃciently large, the manager never proposes a
good project.
In circumstances like this one, undivided control is never optimal. To create value, one needs
to discourage the manager from engaging in this form of unproductive rent-seeking. It is too much
to expect the legal system to detect and punish all such destructive behaviors, but one may be able
to write a contract that discourages the action by blocking extortionate transfers.
There are various legal norms and rules that help to bar extortion, as when an agent has a legally
enforceable duty of loyalty to a principal or when rules about good faith and fair dealing apply.
We discuss these in Section 7 and the extent to which courts disallow parties from threatening
to take otherwise legal actions as a way of obtaining concessions. To explore the consequences of
such rules, our model assumes the parties can contractually choose to disallow transfers in any
subsequent bargaining over the ﬁrm’s course of action. The parties choose whether to impose this
additional protection at the same time they choose the ﬁrm’s governance structure.
We have the following corollary to Proposition 7:
Corollary 2 If H is suﬃciently large, undivided control can be optimal only if transfers from the
stakeholders are disallowed.
13For the rest of the paper, we make the standing assumption that H is large enough for the
conclusion of Corollary 2.
When control is undivided and the manager cannot demand transfers, it is in the manager’s
interest to generate proposals that are productive. Moreover, the manager chooses to implement
a proposal whenever mi ≥ 0. The cost of restrictions on transfers is that the manager implements
unproductive proposals whenever they redistribute suﬃcient wealth. Let ˜ U denote the joint ex-
pected surplus when control is undivided. The joint surplus is 2πg if the state is good, 2πb if the
state is bad and mb ≥ 0, and zero otherwise. So,
˜ U = 2[qπg + (1 − q)Pr[mb ≥ 0]πb] (7)
If control is shared, veto power over the manager’s proposals protects the stakeholder from
unproductive rent-seeking. There is consequently no need to disallow transfers as such transfers
improve ex post decision-making. Participation in control is therefore a substitute for the protection
aﬀorded by restrictions on transfers.
With limits on transfers, there is no ex post bargaining when control is undivided. This alters
our comparative statics conclusions, because changes in bargaining costs now impact shared control
and undivided control asymmetrically.
Proposition 8 Suppose undivided control is associated with limits on transfers. As the stakeholder
becomes better informed (z increases), there is a corresponding increase in the beneﬁt of shared
control and no change in the beneﬁt of undivided control.
Under shared control, the stakeholder has input into the decision-making process and can use his
information to improve the quality of decisions by blocking bad projects. In contrast, when control
is undivided, the stakeholder has no inﬂuence on the manager’s decision-making regardless of how
informed she is. Thus, in contrast to the situation without legal restrictions on transfers, the degree
to which the stakeholder is informed now becomes an important determinant of the optimal control
structure.
Similarly, it is no longer the case that an increase in either the variability of the redistribution,
σ, or in the mean level of redistribution ¯ r impacts shared and undivided control in similar ways.
Recall from Corollary 1 that the value of shared control control is decreasing in σ. In contrast, the
value of undivided control can actually increase with σ. In addition, undivided control decreases
in the average level of redistribution:
Lemma 1 If control is undivided and there are limits on transfers, then as σ increases, the manager
adopts fewer bad proposals, which raises the total surplus from adopted projects if and only if
¯ mb = πb + ¯ r ≥ 0. In addition, ˜ U is decreasing in the mean level of redistribution ¯ r.
14Proof. The impact of σ2 on the value of undivided control depends on whether the likelihood the
manager pursues a bad proposal, Pr[¯ mb + σ ≥ 0] = Pr[¯ mb/σ +  ≥ 0] increases or decreases. The
manager is less likely to pursue a bad proposal as σ2 increases if and only if ¯ mb ≥ 0. 
Lemma 1 implies that if the redistributive consequences of proposals are large (¯ r ≥ |πb|),
undivided control becomes more favorable relative to shared control as the redistribution becomes
more variable. Intuitively, when the manager has a bias toward implementing the project, increasing
the mass in the positive tail of the distribution r has no impact on his decision-making; however,
increasing the realizations in the negative tail causes the manager to shift towards maintaining the
status quo in some states. As already discussed, simply shifting the mean level of redistribution
has no impact on shared control (nor undivided control when there is bargaining). However, when
there are limits on transfers, an increase in ¯ r increases the likelihood that the manager pursues a
bad proposal when control is undivided. The following result is a direct implication of Corollary 1
and Lemma 1:
Proposition 9 If H is suﬃciently large and ¯ r ≥ |πb|, then ˜ U − S is increasing in σ. Moreover,
˜ U − S is decreasing in ¯ r.
The comparative statics from shifts in q (the likelihood that a project is good) and from shifts
in total value parameters πg and πb remain unchanged when there are limits on transfers. Namely,
an increase in q favors shared control and changes in the surplus associated with good and bad
projects have an ambiguous eﬀect on ˜ U − S. When control is undivided and there are limits on
transfers, an increase the value destroyed by a bad proposal makes it less likely that the manager
will implement one, but more costly when he does so.
5 Control and Proposal Generation
In this section, we extend our model to allow project quality and the level of redistribution to
depend on management’s choices. We assume that after the control arrangements are agreed and
any initial transfers are made, the manager chooses eﬀorts and incurs a cost C(q, ¯ r), where q is the
probability of a good proposal and ¯ r is the mean level of redistribution.11 We assume that C(q, ¯ r)
is increasing in both q and ¯ r.
In our model with shared control, when the manager’s eﬀort levels (q, ¯ r) are observable but
not contractible, the manager’s bargaining advantage allows her to capture the full surplus from
any projects provided that rl ≥ πg so that sg is always negative. However, neither surplus nor
the set of projects implemented is aﬀected by redistributive eﬀorts of the manager. Hence, the
11As before, the manager can engage in extortion instead of generating productive proposals.
15manager has no incentive to increase ¯ r. In contrast, with undivided control, the manager keeps
any additional amounts she can redistribute to herself, creating an incentive to exert redistributive
eﬀort. Hence, if the marginal cost of redistributive eﬀort is low, the manager engages in a positive
level of redistributive eﬀort. To summarize:
Proposition 10 Suppose the manager’s eﬀort choices (q, ¯ r) are observed. With shared control, the
manager sets r to its minimum value when rl ≥ πg, but the manager may exert positive redistributive
eﬀort when control is undivided.
The comparative incentives for setting q are less clear. With shared control, some good projects
get blocked so the manager gets only part of the potential gain from discovering additional good
projects, which mutes the manager’s incentive to raise q. With undivided control, good projects
are always implemented, but additional good projects cause the manager to lose the rents it could
otherwise earn from implementing bad projects, which again mutes the manager’s incentive to raise
q. Some extreme cases, however, are clear: shared control leads to nearly eﬃcient decisions for z
close to one or σ close to zero provided that rl ≥ πg.
For the case of unobserved eﬀorts, if control is undivided, the manager solves:
maxq,¯ r q(πg + ¯ r) + (1 − q)E[max(0,πb + ¯ r + σ)] − C(q, ¯ r) (8)
Taking the derivative with respect to ¯ r yields q + (1 − q)Pr[πb + ¯ r + σ > 0] − ∂C/∂¯ r.
If control is instead shared and the equilibrium levels of ¯ r and ts are ˜ r and ˜ ts, then the manager’s
eﬀort choices solves:
maxq,¯ r qz(2πg − max(0,sg)) + q(1 − z)E[max(0,πg + ¯ r + σ − ˜ ts)] − C(q, ¯ r) (9)
For this objective, the derivative with respect to ¯ r is qz Pr[sg > 0] + q(1 − z)Pr[πg + ¯ r + σ >
˜ ts] − ∂C/∂¯ r.
For both patterns of control, with unobserved eﬀorts, the marginal beneﬁt of increasing ¯ r is the
probability that a project is adopted, and the marginal cost ∂C/∂¯ r is subtracted from that. All
good projects and some bad projects are implemented when control is undivided, while only some
good projects are implemented when control is shared. So, holding q ﬁxed, the marginal returns
are higher when control is undivided so the choice of ¯ r is also higher. Depending on C, the choice
of q could be nearly ﬁxed, but in general the manager’s choice of q diﬀers for undivided and shared
control making the formal comparison ambiguous.
Other economics papers have also studied how participation in decisions aﬀects eﬀort choices.
Milgrom (1988) argues that allowing employees to inﬂuence decisions leads them to devote more
16eﬀort to generating relevant information, but that information may be reported selectively and
attempts to inﬂuence the distribution of beneﬁts may lead to excessive eﬀort, which is better
devoted to other, more productive uses.12 Aghion and Tirole (1997) apply a similar idea to the
delegation of control to an agent, arguing that delegation leads the agent to exert greater eﬀort
in generating decision-relevant information. In our analysis, increasing managerial control leads
unambiguously to greater unproductive rent-seeking when eﬀort is observed and suggests that the
same result will often hold when eﬀort is unobserved. However, if the stakeholder is suﬃciently
informed or distributional consequences of decisions are easy to assess in advance (z is large or σ
is small), shared control leads to nearly eﬃcient eﬀort choices.
6 Incentives and Control
In this section, we allow the parties to contract on the division of surplus generated within the ﬁrm,
2πi. We also return to baseline case in which q and ¯ r are exogenous. Speciﬁcally, the parties can
allocate a share of α ∈ [0,1] of the surplus to the manager, so that the payoﬀs of the manager and
stakeholder are mi(α) = α2πi + r and si(α) = (1 − α)2πi − r. When there are limits on transfers
and control is undivided, it is clear from equation (7) that an increase in α induces the manager to
implement fewer bad proposals. If there are no other constraints on the choice of α, it is optimal to
set α = 1 and make the manager the full residual claimant. Externalities remain as a consequence
of the non-contractible redistribution r.
In contrast, changes in α have no impact on the surplus associated with shared control:
Proposition 11 The expected surplus associated with shared control is independent of the man-
ager’s share of the realized surplus α. If there are limits on transfers, the value of undivided control,
˜ U, is increasing in α.
Proof. Fix α0 and suppose that in equilibrium the manager must pay the stakeholder a transfer
t0 to obtain approval for a good proposal, i.e., t0 solves equation (2). The probability that a
good proposal is blocked is Pr[mg(α0) < t0]. Consider an ownership share α1 6= α0, and let
t1 = t0 + 2πg(α1 − α0). t1 solves equation (2) and Pr[mg(α1) < t1] = Pr[mg(α0) < t0]. 
As in many models, ownership of returns is complementary with control. In our analysis,
however, this result arises only when there are limits on transfers. If there are no such limits,
changes in α have no impact when control is shared and have an ambiguous eﬀect when control is
undivided. As in the comparative statics for σ discussed in Section 3, this ambiguity arises because
12This point is further elaborated by Milgrom and Roberts (1992), who emphasize these inﬂuence costs play in
explaining the very diﬀerent decision processes that ﬁrms use, for example, to set pay for individual workers or prices
for individual products.
17increases in the manager’s share of the realized surplus can decrease tu and thereby have a negative
eﬀect on expected surplus.
7 “Good Faith” and “Fair Dealing”
In Section 4, we assume that the manager and stakeholder can commit not to engage in ex post
bargaining when control in undivided. When the manager has a ﬁduciary responsibility to the
stakeholder (for example when the stakeholder is a shareholder), then it is clear that demanding
a transfer as payment for not taking a value-destroying action would violate the manager’s oblig-
ations. However, courts (in the U.S.) also disallow certain types of agreements in non-ﬁduciary
relationships, such as that between management and creditors. In particular, Hetherington (1972)
states that “[i]n the name of good faith, fair dealing, and similar concepts, the courts have imposed
limits on the bargaining process and on the exercise of contract and property rights in non-ﬁduciary
business dealings” (p. 926). The law requires that in any contractual relationship the parties act
in good faith. One prominent formulation of the duty of good faith is by the New York Court
of Appeals, which stated that in “every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party
shall do anything which will have the eﬀect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party
to receive the fruits of the contract” (see Bab, 1991, p. 861).
Summers (1968) outlines various acts that constitute “bad faith” and thus violate this implied
covenant, including abuse of bargaining power, failure to fulﬁll the spirit of a contract, lack of
diligence, exploiting another party’s weakness to obtain a favorable readjustment to a contract,
and abuse of power to specify any contract terms (that the parties left unspeciﬁed at the outset).
In addition, threats of harm through an otherwise legal action may also violate the covenant of
good faith. Although implicit threats are a common bargaining tactic, there is boundary beyond
which this kind of behavior is unacceptable. In particular, the courts have disallowed parties from
obtaining concessions by threatening to take an action, where the sole purpose of the action is to
impose harm. Hetherington provides examples of in which the “illegality of the conduct in each
case appears to lie in the eﬀort of one party to inﬂuence future conduct by threatening deliberate
injury to an existing contractual or property right or business interest of the other party” (p. 932).
In one such example, a buyer of a house in a residential community sought to obtain a refund from
the builder by threatening to in turn resell the property to an “undesirable” purchaser.
In the context of our model, we argue that the legal limits on bargaining tactics rule out threats
by the manager to take value-destroying actions in order to obtain rents from the stakeholder (we
provide an eﬃciency-based explanation for why such limits are indeed optimal). However, we argue
that such limits do not stop the manager from actually proceeding with a value-destroying proposal
18when in his interest. The premise of our analysis is that whether a proposal is value-destroying
or not is diﬃcult, if not impossible, to verify by the courts (otherwise the parties would agree in
advance to implement only value-creating proposals). However, if the manager demands concessions
in exchange for not implementing a proposal, the manager is eﬀectively acknowledging that the
proposal is harmful. There are only a limited set of circumstances in which management can
legitimately extract concessions by threatening to pursue a certain course of action. For example,
ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress can threaten to declare bankruptcy to induce creditors and unions to
renegotiate their contracts (see Bab for a discussion of whether this kind of pressure in the case of
bondholders violates the duty of good faith).
A concern that we have deemphasized in our analysis and discussion is that a stakeholder with
veto power over a decision can use that power to extort concessions from management. Stakeholders
also have obligations to act in good faith. Stakeholders, such as creditors, that use their position
to extract “excessive” concessions face possible legal liability for acting in bad faith. In our model,
this problem never arises as management has all the bargaining power and can extract all the rents
from the relationship. Even if a stakeholder has greater bargaining power, management typically
has more options for action and therefore more ways to protect itself than does a stakeholder
with no veto right. For this reason, there is much lower risk of exploitation and little beneﬁt to
placing limits on bargaining (see footnote 14 for additional discussion of this point when applied
to creditors). As is clear from several of the acts of bad faith cited above, the courts recognize the
critical role of power imbalances in giving rise to abuses. In the following subsections, we discuss
how our model applies to speciﬁc relationships in ﬁrms.
8 Applications
Debt Contracts
Three critical aspects of any debt contract are the interest rate(s), the maturity of the debt,
and any covenants associated with the debt. Lender can increase their eﬀective control over a ﬁrm
by shortening debt maturities (forcing ﬁrms to reﬁnance and renegotiate their agreements more
frequently) and using covenants. Covenants place limits on a potentially broad range of activities
and decisions. For example, covenants may limit the payment of dividends to shareholders, limit a
ﬁrm’s leverage, limit both the sale and acquisition of assets, and require ﬁrms to maintain a certain
line of business. Covenants may even limit decision rights often considered a deﬁning aspect of
ownership, including the right to make changes to the management team and the board.
Covenants give lenders an eﬀective veto right over any decision that results in the violation
of a covenant; to proceed with a course of action constrained by a covenant, management must
19either obtain a waiver from lenders or must reﬁnance the debt. In our model, the stakeholder
receives veto rights over a decision only if such rights lead to greater ﬁrm value. If undivided
control maximizes ﬁrm value, but causes harm to the stakeholder in the form of redistribution, the
manager must compensate the stakeholder through transfers.13 In the context of debt contracting,
lenders thus trade oﬀ stronger control rights with higher promised rates of return (Roberts and
Bradley (2004) provide empirical evidence supporting the negative relationship between yields and
the restrictiveness of covenants).
It is common for covenants to trigger renegotiation between lenders and ﬁrms and for lenders
to demand concessions in exchange for waiving covenants. Beneish and Press (1993) empirically
analyze the cost to ﬁrms of violating an accounting-based covenant. The majority of ﬁrms in their
sample obtain waivers in exchange for substantial increases in interest rates and other fees. Lenders
also frequently obtain greater control in the form of additional covenants. The authors also show
that ﬁrms unable to obtain waivers suﬀer greater costs. Such ﬁrms typically either reﬁnance their
debt at signiﬁcantly higher interest rates or must divest assets to pay down their debt.
While ﬁrms often seek waivers of onerous covenants, it much more diﬃcult to identify cases in
which ﬁrms demand concessions from lenders in exchange for refraining from taking an action not
constrained by any covenant. As discussed above, although managers do not have a ﬁduciary duty to
lenders, managers are still required to act in good faith with respect to their contractual obligations
to lenders. Demanding concessions in exchange for not taking a value-destroying investment would
arguably be deemed as coercive, violating the duty of good faith. If such an investment beneﬁts
shareholders (at the expense of debtholders), managers are more likely simply to proceed with the
investment rather than to negotiate with debtholders.
There are certain circumstances in which borrowers can extract concession from lenders. For
example, Bab and Coﬀee and Klein (1991) discuss how ﬁrms seeking to repurchase their debt can
use various techniques to pressure bondholders to tender their bonds (at a premium to the current
market value, but below the face value). As mentioned above, one technique is for ﬁrms to threaten
to declare bankruptcy. Bab argues, however, that the extent to which ﬁrms can extract rents from
bondholders through this type of pressure is very limited.
Given the asymmetry in the need for renegotiation that results from legal rules, our model
predicts that covenants will be used more often in situations where renegotiation leads to relatively
eﬃcient outcomes. In particular, if bargaining is costless and eﬃcient, then it is always optimal
to impose restrictive covenants and negotiate waivers ex post.14 In our theory, the probability (z)
13It is not essential that these payments be made ex ante; they could be in principle be made at any date. Since
we allow arbitrary transfers, an implicit assumption is that the parties have suﬃcient wealth (or expected wealth)
to make any promised payments. In the context of debt contracting, we are thus assuming that management has
suﬃcient collateral to support any promised future transfers.
14 A recent paper by Zwiebel and Garleanu (2006) seeks to explain why debt contracts often have tight covenants
20that the stakeholder is informed is a critical determinant of bargaining costs, because there is a
lower likelihood of bargaining breakdowns as the stakeholder becomes better informed. If banks
are better informed and can engage in bargaining at lower cost than holders of publicly traded
bonds, our theory predicts that bank debt should contain more more restrictive covenants than
public debt. Supporting both the premise and the conclusion of this statement is a detailed study
of privately placed debt by Carey et. al. (1993), who argue that private lenders both engage
in greater due diligence and information acquisition than public bondholders and impose tighter
covenants. Similarly, Gilson and Warner (1998) and Roberts and Bradley also provide evidence
that bank debt has more restrictive covenants than public debt.
Another implication of our model is that undivided control is favored as the probability that
the manager proposes value-creating projects (q) increases. Nash, Netter and Poulsen (2003) show
that the debt contracts of ﬁrms with potentially high future growth opportunities are less likely to
contain provisions that limit the ability of these ﬁrms to raise additional ﬁnance in the future.15 The
authors also show that ﬁrms with a high likelihood of ﬁnancial distress are more likely to borrow
with restrictive covenants. As a ﬁrm’s value declines and its leverage increases, management has
greater incentives to take on risky projects, regardless of whether such projects have a negative or
positive net present value. In our model, such a situation is consistent with a lower probability that
proposals are value-creating (low q) and a higher average level of redistribution (high ¯ r), implying
greater sharing of control.
Closed Corporations
It is frequently argued that minority shareholders in closely held corporations are particularly
vulnerable to exploitation (see, for example, O’Neal and Thompson, 1985, and Hetherington and
Dooley, 1977). Unlike most large publicly traded corporations in the U.S., closely held corporations
frequently have a single shareholder or a strong coalition of a few individuals that control a majority
of the shares. Moreover, both majority and minority shareholders are commonly employees of the
corporation, making the parties particularly dependent on the ﬁrm and creating additional conﬂicts
of interests. One risk is that the controlling group may fail to pay dividends and instead pay inﬂated
that are renegotiated (rather than having renegotiation in the absence of a covenant). In their analysis, which
introduces a model similar to ours, ﬁrms signal project quality by granting creditors control, leading to a situation
in which covenants are tight. The paper rejects the notion that renegotiation in the absence of a covenant is any
diﬀerent (or any more “unseemly”) than renegotiation in the presence of a binding covenant. However, as we argue, if
there were no prohibitions on renegotiation, then management would have almost unlimited possibilities of extracting
rents from creditors by manufacturing bad projects. Certainly, creditors can also abuse their power, but their powers
are limited to withholding approval of a management proposal (limiting renegotiation would thus have high costs
with only limited beneﬁts). Our reading of the legal literature on this subject suggests that the law indeed recognizes
that protections are critical precisely when there is a large imbalance of power.
15Roberts and Bradley note that while such ﬁrms retain ﬂexibility to obtain future ﬁnancing, they are more likely
to have restrictive covenants in other respects.
21salaries to controlling parties or sell assets to related parties at less than fair market value, making
it diﬃcult for the minority to realize any tangible value from its ownership stake.
These risks are mitigated if minority shareholders have veto rights over those decisions for which
the potential for abuse is most severe. As O’Neal and Thompson and Easterbrook and Fischel (1986)
discuss, veto rights also create the potential for bargaining deadlock and minority shareholder with
veto rights may be able to extort concessions from the majority. However, consistent with our own
analysis, Hetherington and Dooley argue that the minority’s power to withhold approval creates
“exploitative opportunities... [which are] much more limited than those of the majority”(p. 4).
Venture capitalists provide a good illustration of how sophisticated investors structure their
investments in closed corporations. Beyond direct board representation, VC contracts contain
provisions that give VC’s the right to approve major corporate actions, including sale of stock and
payment of dividends. Kaplan and Stromberg (1999) show that venture capitalists typically have
voting rights that exceed their cash-ﬂow rights, including not only direct representation on the board
but also the right to approve a certain number of outside directors.16 Interestingly, Stevenson (2001)
discusses how VC contracts reduce the potential costs of deadlock by incorporating tie-breaking
provision in their contracts (such as compulsory arbitration).
Kaplan and Stromberg (1999) also document that the control rights of VC’s are contingent on
performance, so that a VC’s ability to control decisions decreases if a ﬁrm performs well. One
potential explanation for this evolution of control rights is given by Aghion and Bolton (1992). In
their model, the optimal contract has investors take greater control in bad states of the world. Our
model does not provide a dynamic theory of control, but a natural extension would allow investors
to update their beliefs about the average quality of an entrepreneur’s proposals (q). In such an
extension, strong performance would cause VC’s to increase their assessment of proposal quality
and grant entrepreneurs greater control.
The VC approach to conﬂicts in closed corporations may work less well for other classes of
shareholders, calling for protections besides shared control. To increase the protection of minority
shareholders, some states have imposed an “enhanced” ﬁduciary duty on the majority and are
more likely to intervene in cases in which otherwise legitimate transactions harm the minority.
This reduces the need to grant the minority veto power and so reduces bargaining deadlock, but it
relies on the ability of the courts to identify exploitative behavior.
Employee Control
Hansmann (1996) emphasizes that a barrier to employee control of ﬁrms is the heterogeneity
16In the model of this paper, only management makes proposals and only shared control based on vetoes is analyzed.
In reality, among the important powers of the board is to replace management, which raises profound potential for
conﬂict between founders and the VC, so the procedure for appointing board members can be critical.
22of interests among employees. For example, the decision to close a particular plant or to cut a
certain product line and reinvest resources elsewhere hurts some workers while potentially beneﬁting
others. Serious conﬂicts among employees can also arise over whether to distribute earnings in
the form of higher wages or dividends; employees with more shares beneﬁt relatively more from
dividends. Hansmann observes that even when employees hold a signiﬁcant share of a ﬁrm’s equity
through employee stock ownership plans, ﬁrms typically structure the plans to minimize the role of
employees in corporate governance. He provides examples of ﬁrms in which employees own 100% of
the stock, but which are eﬀectively “operated as nonproﬁt institutions in which [self-perpetuating]
directors... are charged with managing the ﬁrm as ﬁduciaries for the beneﬁt of employees” (p. 107).
In the context of our model, we interpret such an arrangement as undivided control by manage-
ment. Speciﬁcally, suppose the “manager” represents a self-interested board that has the mandate
to maximize the total welfare of employees, but also derives private beneﬁts of control. In addition,
suppose the “stakeholder” represents a particular group of employees with signiﬁcant equity in the
ﬁrm. Our theory suggests that undivided control is optimal if the distributional consequences of
decisions are highly variable (high σ2), there is asymmetric information about the extent of redis-
tribution (low z), and if conﬂicts of interest are not too severe (i.e., if q is not too low and ¯ r is
not too high). It is important to emphasize that heterogeneity in interests as measured by ¯ r favors
shared control. It is when the diﬀerential impact of decisions on stakeholders is highly variable and
hard to measure (and hence unobserved) that undivided control is desirable.
For the reasons discussed above, investment decisions can have large distributional consequences
for employees, and these may be extremely diﬃcult to assess; moreover, parties frequently have
disparate information regarding these consequences. For example, a source of conﬂict between
management and workers often involves the implementation of a new technology in the workplace,
which has the potential to displace certain groups of workers. In this example, management may
have better information on the long-term consequences of the technology (in other circumstances,
workers may in fact have better information about their priorities and thus the costs associated with
a particular policy). Consistent with Hansmann’s observations about limited employee decision-
making, our theory suggests that granting employing veto rights over these types of decisions
results in lower ﬁrm value. In particular, the ineﬃciencies in decision-making associated with an
unconstrained board is lower than the costs of ineﬃcient decision-making due to bargaining failures
when control is shared.
239 Conclusion
In the normal course of business, ﬁrms often serve the interests of a diverse group of stakeholders
or patrons, including investors, workers, lenders, suppliers and customers. The ﬁrm’s important
decisions can aﬀect these groups—and even individuals within the groups—in diﬀerent ways. In
a world of zero transaction costs, bargaining among the various parties could guide them to agree
on decisions that take all interests into account and maximize total value. If there is asymmetric
information or other impediments to perfect bargaining, however, then the outcome will sometimes
fail to maximize total value. The form this failure takes can diﬀer according to whether control is
shared. If the stakeholders besides management share control rights and if the bargainers fail to
agree on compensating transfers, then the stakeholders may veto even value-enhancing decisions.
If control is undivided and bargainers fail to reach agreement, then the ﬁrm’s decision calculus
may neglect the interests of some stakeholders, leading the ﬁrm sometimes to pursue projects that
destroy value.
In this paper, we compare the losses from shared control with those from undivided control to
determine when—meaning for which classes of decisions—control should be shared. Our comparison
diﬀers both from Hansmann (1996), who emphasizes only how the costs of shared control are
aﬀected by diversity of interests, and from Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990),
who emphasize the hold-up problem and ﬁnd that shared control is never optimal. Unlike these
earlier analyses, the eﬀectiveness of legal rules, particularly ﬁduciary duties and obligations of good
faith and fair dealing, play an important role in our analysis, because they impose a discipline on
management that reduces the losses from undivided control. Without some such discipline, we
argue, control would need to be shared for a much wider set of decisions so that stakeholders can
be better protected against managerial opportunism.
Legal rules also aﬀect the comparative statics of control in an interesting way, because they
distinguish undivided control as the structure in which ex post bargaining occurs least frequently.
In our model, legal rules eliminate bargaining when control is undivided. Consequently, changes
in the environment that make bargaining outcomes more eﬃcient (increases in z in our model)
favor shared control over undivided control. As an illustration, when applied to loan agreements,
the theory predicts more restrictive covenants in bank lending than in bond issues, because it is
easier to renegotiate a contract with a single lender than with a widely dispersed group of small
bondholders.
While the preceding analysis gives a nuanced answer to the question of when control is shared,
more is needed to explain why ownership rights, unlike other control rights, tend to be concen-
trated among a relatively homogeneous group of stakeholders. Our answer is based on a selection
argument—identifying which rights remain after some are assigned by contract—rather than by an
24assignment argument, which emphasizes why the remaining rights are assigned to some particular
group.
The ﬁrst step in our explanation is a simple one: ownership rights are by deﬁnition rights
which are not assigned by contract; they are residual control rights. So, explaining the observation
amounts to answering the question: why does shared control among heterogeneous stakeholders
almost always take the form of contractual veto rights over particular classes of decisions, rather
than some non-contractual form?
We oﬀered a simple answer to that question in the introduction, by specifying that the alter-
native non-contractual means of sharing control is some sort of voting scheme. Compared to veto
rights, voting rights on a board of directors oﬀers weaker and/or less well targeted protection for
stakeholders with narrow interests. It also creates more opportunities for value-destroying inﬂuence
activities and rent seeking. Finally, it creates costs by engaging stakeholders in decisions for which
they may have little information, expertise or interest.
Thus, our analysis proposes an answer to the puzzle of undivided control for residual rights.
Stakeholders who need protection against exploitative decisions generally ﬁnd that such protection
is secured most reliably and at least cost in the form of veto rights over the relevant classes of
decisions. If interests can be adequately secured in that way, what remains are costs, but not
beneﬁts, to joint participation on a board of directors. Thus, for patrons with conﬂicting interests,
control rights are commonly shared by contract provisions but not by joint participation on a board
of directors that exercises residual control.
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